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Abstract 
Recent research suggests that much of the cross-firm variation in measured productivity is due to differences 
in use of advanced management practices. Many of these practices – including monitoring, goal setting, and 
the use of incentives – are mediated through employee decision-making and effort. To the extent that these 
practices are complementary with workers’ skills, better-managed firms will tend to recruit higher-ability 
workers and adopt pay practices to retain these employees. We use a unique data set that combines detailed 
survey data on the management practices of German manufacturing firms with longitudinal earnings records 
for their employees to study the relationship between productivity, management, worker ability, and pay. As 
documented by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) there is a strong partial correlation between management 
practice scores and firm-level productivity in Germany. In our preferred TFP estimates only a small fraction 
of this correlation is explained by the higher human capital of the average employee at better-managed firms. 
A larger share (about 13%) is attributable to the human capital of the highest-paid workers, a group we 
interpret as representing the managers of the firm. And a similar amount is mediated through the pay 
premiums offered by better-managed firms. Looking at employee inflows and outflows, we confirm that 
better-managed firms systematically recruit and retain workers with higher average human capital. Overall, 
we conclude that workforce selection and positive pay premiums explain just under 30% of the measured 
impact of management practices on productivity in German manufacturing. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a typical four-digit manufacturing industry in the U.S., plants at the 90th percentile of total factor 
productivity (TFP) are about twice as productive as those at the 10th percentile (Syverson, 2004, 2011). 
These very large differences in between-firm productivity are highly persistent, contributing to 
significant disparities in economic performance over time and across countries.1 They are also central to 
a growing body of theoretical research in macroeconomics, industrial organization, and trade. In labor 
economics, much empirical and theoretical work finds a strong connection between firm performance 
and average wages, which suggests firm productivity could help explain cross sectional wage inequality. 
Furthermore, many recent papers attribute a significant fraction of the growth in wage inequality across 
individuals to growing differences between establishments.2 Since wage differences between firms are 
closely correlated with performance differences, understanding what drives the dispersion in 
establishment performance could help us understand why inequality has risen so sharply in recent 
decades.  
As suggested by the seminal work of Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) a key correlate of plant-
level productivity is the adoption of advanced management practices, including employee monitoring, 
financial incentives, and modern inventory control and work-flow techniques. Bloom, Sadun and Van 
Reenen (2015) argue that about half of the difference in average TFP between plants in the U.S. and 
Southern EU countries is explained by an index of advanced practices that they interpret as “management 
capital”. At the very micro level, Bloom et al (2013) find a large causal role for management practices 
in a field experiment with Indian textile plants.  
While some management practices can directly impact productivity, many others – like monitoring, goal 
setting, and use of incentives – are mediated through employee decision-making and effort. If advanced 
management practices are complementary with higher-ability employees, as seems plausible, then one 
would expect firms that use these practices to systematically alter both the skill composition of their 
workforce and the structure of their pay system.3 
1  For example, Bailey, Hulten and Campbell (1992); Hsieh and Klenow (2009); Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta 
(2013). 
2 See Card, Heining and Kline (2013) for Germany; Song, Price, Guvenen, Bloom and Von Wachter (2015) or Barth, Bryson, 
Davis and Freeman (2014) for the US; Faggio, Salvanes and Van Reenen (2010) for the UK.  
3 Milgrom and Roberts (1990) argue that modern manufacturing processes and organizational methods are highly 
complementary, leading firms to adopt clusters of practices. 
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In this paper we formally investigate the extent to which management – as proxied by an index of 
adoption of advanced management practices - affects measured productivity through the channels of 
workforce selection and pay.  Our empirical analysis exploits a unique database of middle-sized German 
manufacturing plants included in the WMS (the World Management Survey, discussed by Bloom and 
Van Reenen, 2007 and Bloom et al., 2014), linked to employee earnings records from the Integrated 
Employment Biographies (IEB) of the Institute for Employment Research. The WMS provides detailed 
survey data on management practices and, through links to the ORBIS database, firm-level financial 
information.  The IEB provides longitudinal data on earnings of workers who were employed at these 
plants, including their pay at previous or subsequent employers, which we use to estimate a person-
specific measure of earnings capacity for each worker, and plant-specific pay premiums for each 
workplace. The worker effects allow us to measure the quality of workers’ skills at each plant as well as 
the relative quality of different employee subgroups.  The pay premiums provide a summary measure of 
the financial incentive system at each plant. 
Analyzing these data through the lens of a simple model of firm-specific productivity, we reach three 
main conclusions. First, plants with higher management scores have higher average worker skills.  Plant-
specific measures of observed skills (e.g., the fraction of workers with a college degree) and of overall 
skills (as recovered from the person effects in a two-way fixed effects model) have a strong correlation 
with measured productivity.  Nevertheless, only a limited fraction of the overall impact of management 
practices is mediated through average worker skills.  A more important channel is though the skills of 
the top quartile of employees at a plant – a group that we interpret as the managers of the plant. Higher 
average skill for this group has an independent influence on plant-level productivity (controlling for 
average worker skills at the plant) and is positively correlated with higher management practice scores. 
Overall about one-sixth of the productivity effect of higher management practices is mediated through 
the average skill level of manager.  
A second finding is that plants with higher management scores pay higher wages relative to the market 
as a whole, controlling for the quality of their workforce. Higher pay premiums account for another 13 
percent of the measured net productivity effect of better management practices. Some of this could 
reflect longer hours or higher levels of performance pay at well managed firms, features we cannot 
directly observe. 
A third finding is that better managed firms are able to build up a superior stock of employees through 
selective hiring and attrition.  In particular, examining job inflows and outflows at the plants in our 
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sample, we find that those with higher management scores are more likely to recruit higher ability 
workers (measured by the permanent component in their earnings) and are less likely to lay off or fire 
the highest skilled workers in the period between 2004 and 2009. 
 
Our paper contributes to many existing literatures. First, as noted above we contribute to the growing 
literature on firm heterogeneity and economic performance (e.g. de Loecker and Goldberg, 2014). 
Second, we try to understand the causes of the heterogeneity in management practices and the link to 
workers’ skills (e.g. Feng and Valero, 2015; Lemos and Scur, 2015). Third, we link to work on corporate 
culture by economists and management scholars (e.g. Guiso et al, 2013, 2015; O’Reilly, 1989). Finally, 
we contribute to the literature on the importance of managers for firm performance (e.g. Bertrand and 
Schoar, 2003; Bennedsen et al, 2007). 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II describes are empirical framework, Section III the 
data and Section IV the results. Some concluding comments are offered in Section V. The Online 
Appendices contain more details about the data and many additional specifications and robustness 
checks. 
 
II. EMPIRICAL MODELS 
a. Conceptual Framework 
The classical approach to understanding productivity differences across firms or plants is “reductionist”: 
after properly accounting for differences in capital and other non-labor inputs per worker, any remaining 
difference in productivity at a given point in time is by definition a measure of the quality of the 
workforce.4  Lucas (1978) offers a more sophisticated version of this approach that accounts for firm 
heterogeneity. In his span of control model, the talent of the CEO determines the productivity of the 
firm. More talented CEOs run larger (or more complex) firms, so the relationship between management 
and productivity boils down to the human capital of the CEO.  
 
Although the Lucas (1978) model is powerful and parsimonious, we view the focus on the CEO as overly 
narrow. For example, many iconic firms such as Toyota, GE, IBM and Lincoln Electric remain 
successful even after their CEO dies and/or all the original managers have left the firm.  Management 
scholars refer to this as firm “capability” or “corporate culture”.  Building on this framework, we view 
the quality of the workforce, the pay strategy of the firm, and the adoption of advanced management 
                                                 
4 Comparisons of productivity over time are also affected by differences in technology.  See Jorgenson (1991) for a brief 
history of productivity measurement and growth accounting. 
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practices as jointly endogenous choices that reflect the underlying quality of management of the firm.  
We ask to what extent the measured productivity effects of advanced management practices reflect the 
impact of higher human capital of all employees at firms that adopt these practices, or the higher human 
capital of the managers. 
 
As a framework for our empirical analysis we adopt a standard production function approach that 
incorporates variation across firms in both total factor productivity and the quality of labor. Specifically, 
suppose that value of the output of firm j in period t, 𝑌𝑗𝑡, depends on inputs of non-management labor 
𝑁𝑗𝑡, management labor 𝑀𝑗𝑡, intermediate inputs 𝐼𝑗𝑡, and capital 𝐾𝑗𝑡, through a constant returns to scale 
production function: 
𝑌𝑗𝑡 = 𝜃𝑗𝑡  𝑓(𝑄𝑁𝑗𝑡𝑁𝑗𝑡 , 𝑄𝑀𝑗𝑡𝑀𝑗𝑡 , 𝐼𝑗𝑡 , 𝐾𝑗𝑡) ,                                               (1) 
where 𝜃𝑗𝑡 represents total factor productivity (TFP) in period t, and 𝑄𝑀𝑗𝑡 and 𝑄𝑁𝑗𝑡 are the productivity 
levels of non-management workers and managers at the firm.  We think of better-managed firms as 
potentially selecting different types of managers and non-management workers and offering different 
incentive packages – both of which could raise 𝑄𝑀𝑗𝑡 and 𝑄𝑁𝑗𝑡.  We also think of these firms as adopting 
practices and management systems that directly increase 𝜃𝑗𝑡. 
 
Using a first order approximation of the function f(.) and the assumption that marginal products of the 
four inputs are equal to their factor prices, the log of output can be expressed as:  
log 𝑌𝑗𝑡 = 𝑠0 + 𝑠𝑁 log 𝑁𝑗𝑡 + 𝑠𝑀 log 𝑀𝑗𝑡 + 𝑠𝐼 log 𝐼𝑗𝑡 +  𝑠𝐾 log 𝐾𝑗𝑡   
+ 𝑠𝑁 log 𝑄𝑁𝑗𝑡 + 𝑠𝑀 log 𝑄𝑀𝑗𝑡 + log 𝜃𝑗𝑡 + 𝜖𝑗𝑡                                                (2) 
where 𝑠0 is a constant, 𝑠𝑁, 𝑠𝑀, 𝑠𝐼 ,  and 𝑠𝐾 are the cost shares of non-management labor, management 
labor, intermediate inputs, and capital, respectively, and 𝜖𝑗𝑡 is an approximation error.
5 If the 
employment share of managers in the workforce is approximately constant across firms (as we implicitly 
assume in our empirical analysis below) this expression can be usefully simplified.  Letting 𝐿𝑗𝑡 = 𝑁𝑗𝑡 +
𝑀𝑗𝑡 represent total employment and 𝑠𝐿=𝑠𝑀+𝑠𝑁 represent the cost share of labor inputs, and defining 𝑄𝑗𝑡 
as the geometric average of  the productivity levels of managers and non-managers:  
𝑄𝑗𝑡 ≡  [(𝑄𝑁𝑗𝑡)
𝑆𝑁(𝑄𝑀𝑗𝑡)
𝑆𝑀]
1/𝑆𝐿
  ,          (3)   
equation (2) can be rewritten as: 
log 𝑌𝑗𝑡 = 𝑠′0 + 𝑠𝐿 log 𝐿𝑗𝑡 + 𝑠𝐼 log 𝐼𝑗𝑡 +  𝑠𝐾 log 𝐾𝑗𝑡 + 𝑠𝐿 log 𝑄𝑗𝑡 + log 𝜃𝑗𝑡 + 𝜖𝑗𝑡 ,     (2’) 
                                                 
5 Note that the s coefficients in this equation (including both the constant and the factor shares) potentially vary with 
characteristics of the firm such as industry and size. In our models below we control for many observed characteristics in 
recognition of this fact. 
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where 𝑠′0 = 𝑠0 + 𝑠𝑁 log(1 − 𝑚) + 𝑠𝑀 log 𝑚, and m is the employment share of managers. Notice that 
(to first order) the appropriately defined average quality measure 𝑄𝑗𝑡 fully captures variation in the 
relative productivity of both management and non-management labor inputs.  
 
b. Management and Productivity 
To assess the effects of workforce quality on firm productivity we need to measure the skill composition 
of the workforce. The standard approach to measuring labor quality, pioneered by Dennison (1962), is 
to classify workers into subgroups based on observed characteristics (e.g., by white collar/blue collar 
status or education) and control for the shares of workers in each group.  A limitation of this approach 
is that observed characteristics explain only a small share of the variation in wages across workers or 
firms, suggesting that there may be a lot of unobserved heterogeneity in the productivity of the workers 
at different firms. Moreover, the standard approach cannot address the possible impact of wage-based 
incentives on the productivity of labor.  
 
As an alternative, we build on the simple framework developed by Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1996, 
henceforth “AKM”), which decomposes wages into worker- and establishment-specific pay 
components. Specifically, AKM assume that the log of the wage received by worker i in period t can be 
decomposed as: 
log 𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜓𝑱(𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑥′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡  ,                                                         (4) 
where 𝜂𝑖  is an individual-specific pay component, 𝑥′𝑖𝑡𝛽 is a linear index of time varying individual 
characteristics (incorporating the effects of experience and calendar time) 6, J(i,t) is an index function 
that gives the identity of the workplace of individual i in period t , 𝜓𝑗 is a time-invariant wage premium 
paid to all workers at workplace j, and 𝑟𝑖𝑡  is a residual pay component.  In this model, 𝜂𝑖 can be 
interpreted as a measure of worker i’s human capital, incorporating potentially observable factors (like 
education) as well as unobserved attributes like cognitive ability or ambition that raise or lower the 
worker’s productivity regardless of where they work.  The pay premium 𝜓𝑗 can be interpreted as a 
measure of the financial incentives associated with continued employment at the firm.  AKM show that 
under a set of orthogonality assumptions the worker-specific and plant-specific pay components in 
equation (4) can be estimated without bias using ordinary least squares.7 
                                                 
6 We normalize the index 𝑥′𝑖𝑡𝛽 to be equal to 0 for individuals of age 40, so 𝜂𝑖 measures the permanent individual component 
of wages at the roughly the peak of the lifecycle wage profile. 
7 The most controversial implication of these assumptions is that the residual component of wages is uncorrelated with the 
entire sequence of firm identifiers in a worker’s job history. As discussed by CHK, this rules out mobility based on a “match-
specific” component of pay. 
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Card, Heining and Kline (2013) (CHK) show that the AKM model provides a relatively good 
approximation to the structure of wages in Germany, with ?̅?2 statistics of around 90 percent.  They also 
show that more- and less-skilled workers receive approximately the same proportional wage premiums 
at a given establishment – consistent with the simple additive structure of equation (4). Moreover, they 
argue that the assumptions needed for unbiased estimation of the worker and establishment effects in the 
AKM model appear to be roughly satisfied in Germany. In particular, the “match-specific” component 
of the wage residual 𝑟𝑖𝑡 is small in magnitude and uncorrelated with the direction of mobility between 
firms. Given these findings, and the fact that we use the same IEB wage data in our analysis, we use the 
worker and establishment effects estimated by CHK to summarize different workers’ abilities and the 
strength of the financial incentives offered at different workplaces. 8  
 
Specifically, we use the average of the estimated worker effects for full time employees at a given 
establishment (?̅̂?𝑗 ) as a simple proxy for the average human capital of workers at the plant, and the 
estimated wage premium for full time male workers at the establishment ?̂?𝑗  as a proxy for the size of 
the financial incentives offered by firm. 9 We assume that the average productivity of labor inputs at the 
firm is affected by both factors, as well as by the adoption of advanced management practices (indexed 
by a measure Λ 𝑗): 
 log 𝑄𝑗𝑡 = 𝜌0 + 𝜌1 ?̅̂?𝑗 +  𝜌2 ?̂?𝑗 +  𝜌3Λ 𝑗 + 𝜐𝑗𝑡 .                                             (5) 
Given the scaling of the person effects in equation (4) one might expect that 𝜌1 ≈ 1.  Since these effects 
are measured with error, however, and are unavailable for part-time workers and trainees, we expect 
some attenuation in the estimated value of 𝜌1.
10 The magnitude of the coefficient 𝜌2 is less clear. If a 
firm that pays a 10% higher wage premium is rewarded with 10% higher productivity, then 𝜌2 = 1.  If, 
on the other hand, higher or lower wage premiums have no effect on productivity then  𝜌2 = 0.    
 
                                                 
8 Despite the apparent empirical success of the AKM framework, we note that the estimated firm effects are at best a crude 
summary of the pay policy of a given firm. Moreover, the estimation issues may be more difficult for certain types of firms 
– e.g., those that are undergoing a management turnaround during the sample period.  
9 Since the IEB data do not include information on hours, CHK limit their estimated models to full time workers.  Over 90% 
of West German males are full time so this is not too restrictive. Among women, however, close to a third work part time.  
As a result of this fact (and the lower participation rate of females), the sample sizes underlying the CHK estimates are about 
80% larger for men than women, leading to less measurement error in the male effects.  For simplicity, we therefore use the 
establishment wage premiums for men.   
10 CHK estimate the AKM model using data for full-time workers between the ages of 20 and 60, so our average person 
effect estimates exclude part-time workers, trainees, workers in so-called “mini-jobs”, and those under 20 or over 60. 
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As suggested by Lucas (1978) TFP may be affected by the ability of the managers at a firm, as well as 
by the firm’s adoption of advanced management practices. We assume that 
log 𝜃𝑗𝑡 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1 ?̅̂?𝑀𝑗  +  𝜆2Λ 𝑗 +  𝜑𝑗𝑡 ,                                                       (6) 
where  ?̅̂?𝑀𝑗  is the mean value of the estimated person effects for the highest-paid workers at the firm, 
who we assume represent the managers of the firm. Combining equations (2’), (5) and (6) leads to the 
following model for output:  
log 𝑌𝑗𝑡 = 𝑠
′′
0 + 𝑠𝐿 log 𝐿𝑗𝑡 + 𝑠𝐼 log 𝐼𝑗𝑡 +  𝑠𝐾 log 𝐾𝑗𝑡   
+ 𝜋1 ?̅̂?𝑗 + 𝜋2 ?̂?𝑗  +  𝜋3 ?̅̂?𝑀𝑗 +  𝜋4Λ 𝑗 + 𝜖′𝑗𝑡                                        (7) 
where 𝜋1 = 𝑠𝐿𝜌1,  𝜋2 = 𝑠𝐿𝜌2,  𝜋3 = 𝜆1,  𝜋4 = 𝑠𝐿𝜌3 + 𝜆2,  and 𝜖′𝑗𝑡 = 𝜖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑠𝐿 𝜐𝑗𝑡 + 𝜑𝑗𝑡. Equation (7) is 
a standard log-linear 3-factor production function, augmented with four additional productivity factors: 
(1) a measure of the average quality of the plant’s workforce; (2) a measure of the average wage premium 
received by workers at the firm; (3) a measure of the average quality of managers at the firm; and (4) a 
measure of the use of advanced management practices. 
 
Since the factor inputs are endogenous, we also estimate a log-TFP specification where we bring labor, 
capital and intermediate inputs to the left hand side of the equation:  
log 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑡 ≡ log 𝑌𝑗𝑡 − 𝑠𝐿 log 𝐿𝑗𝑡 − 𝑠𝐼 log 𝐼𝑗𝑡 −  𝑠𝐾 log 𝐾𝑗𝑡  
= 𝑠′′0 +  𝜋1 ?̅̂?𝑗 + 𝜋2 ?̂?𝑗  +  𝜋3 ?̅̂?𝑀𝑗 +  𝜋4Λ 𝑗 + 𝜖′𝑗𝑡                                        (8) 
In our empirical analysis below we compare estimates of equations (7) and (8) to estimates of similar 
“reduced form” specifications that excludes the labor quality and wage premium measures and include 
only the management practices variable. If advanced management practices, higher workforce quality, 
and enhanced pay are complementary practices that tend to be adopted as a package by better-managed 
firms, then we expect the measured impact of advanced management practices to be larger in this 
alternative specification, reflecting an “omitted variable” bias.  We also consider controlling for other 
factors that may influence productivity and workforce quality in equations (7) and (8) such as firm age, 
industry, ownership type, the degree of product market competition, etc. 
 
In addition to examining how the productivity-management relationship changes after conditioning on 
worker ability and the firm-specific pay premium, we also examine directly the cross-firm relationship 
between the ability distribution and management scores. We first check whether firms with high 
management scores employ people of above average ability, especially in the upper quartile of the 
within-firm pay distribution. We then investigate the extent to which the positive correlation between 
management practices and the average ability of the workforce is due to selective recruiting and retention 
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of higher-ability workers by better-managed firms. We tackle this question by analyzing leavers and 
joiners at the firms in our data base between 2004 and 2009 (the dates when the management survey 
took place). Using estimates of worker ability based on data from the pre-2003 period we ask whether 
the better managed firms disproportionately recruit and retain those of higher ability.  
 
III. DATA  
Our empirical analysis combines data for the German firms in the World Management Management 
Survey (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom al, 2014) with longitudinal earnings records from the 
Institute for Employment Research (Dorner et al., 2010).  In this section we briefly describe the two 
underlying data sets and our procedure for forming the matched WMS-IEB data base. 
 
a.  The WMS Data Base 
The WMS was developed by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) as an instrument for eliciting reliable 
information on the use of advanced management practices.  The WMS relies on an interview-based 
evaluation tool that scores participating firms from one (“worst practice”) to five (“best practice”) in 
three broad areas.11  The first is monitoring: how well does the firm track what goes on inside its plant(s) 
and use this for continuous improvement?  The second is goal setting: does the firm set appropriate 
targets, track closely aligned outcomes, and take appropriate action if the two are inconsistent? A third 
area is incentives/people management: does the firm promote and reward employees based on 
performance, and systematically try to hire and retain the best employees? 12 
 
To obtain accurate responses the WMS uses a ‘double-blind’ protocol.  Responding plant managers are 
not informed that they are being scored, or shown the scoring grid. They are only told that they are being 
“interviewed about management practices for a piece of work”. Likewise, WMS interviewers are not 
given any information about the firm. 
 
The interview script consists of open-ended questions rather than yes/no queries or checklists. For 
example, the first question on monitoring practices is “Tell me how you monitor your production 
process.” The questions continue, focusing on actual practices and examples, until the interviewer can 
                                                 
11 The survey tool used in the WMS was developed by an international management consulting company.  Not all aspects of 
management behavior are captured by the WMS.  For example, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) focus on CEO and CFO 
management style, capturing (for example) differences in strategy over mergers and acquisitions. 
12 These practices are similar to those emphasized in earlier work on management practices, by for example Ichniowski, 
Prennushi and Shaw (1997) and Black and Lynch (2001). 
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make an accurate assessment of the firm’s practices in a certain area.  The full interview script is reported 
in Appendix Table B1.  
 
The survey universe for the German component of the WMS consists of medium-sized manufacturing 
firms (employing between 50 and 5,000 workers) selected from the ORBIS data base. Firms with under 
50 workers were excluded from the universe because many small firms do not use (or need) advanced 
management practices. Large firms were excluded to ensure that the responses from a single plant 
manager are broadly representative of the firm’s overall practices. Dropping large firms also makes it 
unlikely that the WMS interviewer would have any pre-conceived impressions about the firm or its 
management practices.  
 
The WMS survey is targeted at plant managers, who are typically senior enough to have a good 
understanding of management practices but not so senior as to be detached from day-to-day operations.13 
To insure high response rates and reliable answers the WMS was conducted by MBA-type students with 
some business experience and training. German firms in the WMS were also contacted prior to the 
survey with a letter of endorsement from the Bundesbank.  Importantly, participants were informed that 
the survey was for a “piece of work on lean manufacturing”, with no mention of the words “survey” or 
“research”.  Moreover, interviewees were never asked for financial data – instead these data were 
obtained directly from the ORBIS data base. Finally, the interviewers were encouraged to be persistent,  
so they typically conducted two interviews a day lasting about 45 minutes each, and spent the rest of 
their time contacting managers to schedule interviews. These protocols helped to yield a 44% response 
rate which was uncorrelated with the (independently collected) performance measures.  
 
German firms in the WMS were interviewed in 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2014. Since the estimated worker 
and firm effects are only available for the years up to 2009, we only use the first three survey waves, 
which included 365 medium-sized manufacturing firms, some of which were interviewed two or three 
times (we cluster standard errors at the firm level to deal with this).14 
 
                                                 
13 The survey also collects information on a set of “noise controls” about the interview itself, including the time of day and 
day of the week, characteristics of the interviewee, and the identity of the interviewer. We check whether our results are 
robust to including these controls our regression analysis. 
14 We also looked at the panel dimension of firms, but the panel dimension only exists for a relatively small number of firms 
and there is not enough real time series variation (given measurement error) to identify any significant relationships. 
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Our main measure of management quality was constructed by z-scoring (normalizing to mean 0, 
standard deviation 1) the 18 individual questions in the WMS, averaging these and then z-scoring this 
average. This process yields a management index with mean zero and standard deviation one.  
 
b.  Worker-Level Data from the IEB 
The worker-level data used in our analysis come from the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) 
data base maintained by the IAB. For each job lasting a day or more, the IEB includes employee 
information such as age, gender and education, employer information such as industry and location, and 
job-spell-based information on characteristics such as full time or part time status, average daily wages, 
and occupation. It also includes information on benefit spells for workers who are receiving regular 
unemployment benefits or unemployment assistance.   Dorner et al. (2010) provide more information on 
the sources of data used to create the IEB data. 
 
Appendix A3 describes how we merge firms in the WMS to establishments in the IEB data, primarily 
using the firm/establishment addresses in both datasets, enabling us to link 361 of the 365 firm in the 
WMS to an establishment identifier in the IEB. We then searched the IEB data base to identify all 
individuals who had worked at one (or more) of the matched firms for at least one day between 2002 
and 2009. We located a total of 251,872 workers who met this criterion. For some of our descriptive 
correlations and for our analysis of productivity we construct a panel data set using employee rosters as 
of June 30 to define the set of workers at a given firm in a given year. 
  
To measure worker skills and the wage premiums offered by different firms we use the estimated worker 
and firm effects estimated by CHK. CHK convert the job spell information in the IEB into a longitudinal 
panel with information on a worker’s main job in each year and estimate a version of equation (4) by 
ordinary least squares.  A limitation of the IEB data is that there is no information on usual hours of 
work during a job spell. For this reason, CHK limit their analysis to full time workers: no worker effects 
are available for part time employees or those who hold so-called mini-jobs.15 Henceforth when we refer 
to “wages”, the reader should bear in mind we are referring to daily wages (rather than the hourly wage). 
Another limitation of the IEB data is that daily wage is censored for about 10% of men and 2% of 
women.  CHK use a Tobit model to allocate earnings for the censored cases. (A similar procedure was 
used by Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schonberg, 2009, who also provide some information on the quality 
of the Tobit approximation to the upper tail of wages in Germany).  
                                                 
15 They also exclude job spells where a worker is in training, and spells worked by individuals younger than 20, older than 
60, or with less than 1 year of potential labor market experience. 
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CHK estimated separate models for full-time male and female workers age 20-60 in four overlapping 
intervals: 1985-1991, 1990-1996, 1996-2002 and 2002-2009. For our productivity models we use the 
estimates from the 2002-2009 interval, which roughly correspond to the survey years for the WMS 
(2004-2009).  For all our analysis we use the worker effects from the 1996-2002 interval, as this pre-
dates the measurement of management in 2004, except for the outflow analysis where we use the 2002-
2009 period. 
 
Overall we have estimated person effects for 88% of all workers in the matched WMS firms (98% of 
the relevant population of workers in these firms – e.g. excluding part-timers and workers at firms in 
East Germany, which were excluded by CHK). In all firm level models we control for a quadratic 
function of the coverage ratio (the proportion of workers in the firm for which we have employee fixed 
effects) to partially control for any systematic selectivity biases.  
 
For our inflow and outflow analysis we construct average information by firm on workers who join a 
sample firm or leave a sample firm in the period from 2003 to 2009. Specifically, we focus on three 
types of joiners: job-to-job joiners, who transition from some other firm to a sample firm with no more 
than 2 months between the end of the previous job and the start of the new job; joiners from 
unemployment, who transition from a spell of registered unemployment to a sample firm with no more 
than 2 months between the end of the unemployment spell and the start of the new job; and all other 
joiners.  The latter group includes new labor market entrants, recent immigrants, people who have been 
on maternity leave, people moving from self-employment or a job in the civil service,16 and people with 
longer gaps between their prior job or benefit spell. Likewise, we focus on three types of leavers: job-
to-job leavers, who move to a new firm within 2 months of leaving a sample firm; leavers to 
unemployment, who enter a spell of registered unemployment within 2 months of leaving a job at a 
sample firm; and all other leavers. 
 
We also match in several other datasets to our merged WMS-IEB sample. We use ORBIS for firm-level 
information on sales, intermediate inputs (materials) and capital. From the OECD STAN dataset we 
have industry-level average data on gross output and labor costs, which we match to the WMS plants at 
the three digit level to estimate cost shares. We use the 2000-2009 averages from the STAN data to 
approximately match the time period of the management data. 
                                                 
16 Self-employed workers and civil servants are excluded from the IEB. 
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c. Overview of the Matched WMS and IEB Dataset 
Panel A of Table 1 gives an overview of the key characteristics of the firms included in our matched 
WMS-IEB sample (exact definitions of the variables are presented in Table A1). The firms are 
distributed across 15 of the 16 German Federal states, with 13% in East Germany. On average, sample 
firms have been in business for 64 years, employ 440 workers, and pay a daily wage of just over €100. 
About a quarter of all workers at these firms are female and 12% have a university degree. 
 
The next two rows of the table show the average cost shares of intermediate inputs and labor inputs, 
based on industry-wide averages for German firms reported in the STAN data set. The input share of 
intermediate inputs is relatively large (67% on average) while the average labor share is 23%.  Thus, 
labor costs account for just over two-thirds of value added. 
 
From the WMS we also have information on ownership structure –whether the firm is family-owned, 
non-family privately owned, or institutionally owned (typically by a local government or quasi-
governmental agency).  The sample includes firms in a wide range of ownership situations, including 
about 23% family owned and 13% institutionally owned. 
 
Finally, the remaining rows of Panel A show sample statistics for the WMS management score, and for 
the average estimated worker effects and establishment-level wage premiums.  For ease of interpretation, 
we standardize the management score index and the estimated worker and firm effects to have mean 0 
and standard deviation of 1.17 We have estimated employee fixed effects for just under four-fifths of the 
workers who can be matched to a WMS firm.18  
 
 
IV. RESULTS 
a. Descriptive Analysis 
We begin our analysis of the relationship between management quality, workforce selection, and 
productivity with some simple descriptive comparisons. Figures 1 and 2 show how the distributions of 
                                                 
17 The estimated person and firm effects in an AKM model are only identified up to a linear constant. Since the male and 
female models are estimated separately, the person effects are normalized differently.  We re-center the male and female 
effects to have mean zero across all firms in our sample, then average the person effects for males and females, then 
standardize the resulting mean.  
18 The coverage is smaller in East Germany, where we can only merge an ability measure if the employee has been in a 
connected with a West German firm. We show robustness to dropping all East German firms. 
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wages and estimated person effects, respectively, differ between firms with relatively high management 
scores and other firms. To construct Figure 1 we begin by finding the quintiles of daily wages for all 
workers who are matched to a firm in the WMS sample.  We then identified the “best managed firms” – 
those with management scores in the top 10% of firms in the sample – and all other firms (i.e., those 
with management scores in the bottom 90%) and calculated the fractions of workers in each wage 
quintile at the two groups of firms.  As shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 1, the best-managed 
firms have a relatively high share of workers in the top wage quintile (26%) and a relatively low share 
in the bottom quintile (13.4%).  
 
To construct Figure 2 we followed the same procedure, but used the estimated worker effects, which 
proxy for the long run human capital of the workforce.  The differences between the best managed firms 
and all other firms are a little different using this measure. The best managed firms have more workers 
in the top 2 quintiles than other firms, but no fewer in the bottom quintile. Instead, the gap is made up 
by a shortfall in the shares of workers in quintiles 2 and 3 of the person effects – the lower-middle of the 
skill distribution.  As discussed in more detail below, Figures 1 and 2 imply that firms with more 
advanced management practices have somewhat lower dispersion in daily wages but wider dispersion 
in worker skills.19 
 
More insight into the potential complementarity between advanced management practices and the 
human capital distribution of the workforce is provided in Figures 3 and 4.  Figure 3 is a simple bin-
scatter plot of average management scores (on the y-axis) against the average human capital of all 
employees a firm, as measured by the average person effects (on the x-axis).  Figure 4 is a similar bin-
scatter using measures of management scores and mean person effects that have been residualized to 
control for the effect of firm size. The positive relationship between management quality and the average 
human capital of the workforce is particularly strong after controlling for firm size, which previous work 
has shown is very strongly correlated with management practice scores (e.g. Bloom et al, 2014). 
 
Next we examine the correlates of firm productivity. Figure 5 shows the non-parametric relationship 
between labor productivity - measured by log sales per worker - and the WMS management score. As 
noted by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) there is a positive relationship between the two even after 
controlling for firm size. Figure 6 presents an analogous scatterplot for productivity and the average 
                                                 
19 CHK show that over the past three decades establishments in West Germany have become more specialized in terms of 
the distribution of occupations. Contrary to our expectations, Figure 2 suggests that this tendency is not more pronounced 
among middle sized manufacturing firms with higher management scores.  
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employee fixed effects. There is also a clear positive relationship here, motivating our question of 
whether the impact of management practices on productivity is mediated through employee talent. 
Interestingly the relationship is quite convex, hinting at a greater role for the skill level of managers in 
determining productivity, as specified in equation (6). 
 
b. Correlates of Management Practice Scores 
To provide more contextual information on the relationship between workforce quality and management 
practices, we estimated a series of simple regression models, summarized in Table 2, that relate the 
management z-score at each firm to measures of employee quality and other firm characteristics.  All 
the specifications also control for firm size, the share of female workers, ownership status, the number 
of competitors, firm age, three digit industry, survey year, and location in East Germany.20  Column (1) 
relates management scores to mean employee quality, and confirms the strong positive correlation 
suggested in Figures 3 and 4. Column (2) focuses on mean ability of the top quarter of employees, which 
we assume is a measure of the human capital of the firm’s managers. The coefficient on “managerial 
ability” is about 45% larger than the effect of average employee ability.  Column (3) enters both 
measures and shows that it is managerial ability that matters more – the coefficient on average employee 
ability is insignificant conditional on managerial ability. As shown in column (4), this result is robust to 
controlling for another measure of average human capital, the share of college-educated workers at the 
firm. In Table A2 we show this finding is also robust to including other measures of observable human 
capital (experience, age and tenure), none of which have a large or significant correlation with 
management scores.  
 
Overall Table 2 suggests that the management practice scores and human capital (especially managerial 
ability) are complementary, in the sense that they co-vary together. 
 
IV.B Quantifying the Channels Linking Management Practices to Productivity 
a. Analysis Based on Production Function Estimation 
We begin our analysis of productivity in Table 3 with a straightforward production function approach 
as in equation (7). The basic specifications in columns (1)-(4) control for labor inputs only, while the 
models in columns (5) and (6) include labor and capital, and those in columns (7)-(10) include labor, 
capital, and intermediate inputs.  
                                                 
20 Note that to avoid losing observations due to missing values for the control variables we set missing values to the sample 
mean and include a dummy for an imputed value.  Only a handful of firms have missing data for most control variables, but 
92 firms have missing data on capital (which is not included in Table 2 but is used in later tables).  
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Looking first at the specifications that exclude capital and intermediate inputs, the estimates in column 
(1) show that the WMS management score variable has a relatively large partial correlation with 
productivity (0.26) when there are no controls for worker ability. The magnitude of this coefficient is 
similar to the coefficient from a parallel specification fit to the overall WMS sample covering 34 
countries, reported by Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2015). The coefficient on the management score 
variable falls to 0.20 when we control for average employee ability (column 2), to 0.15 when we control 
for both average worker ability and managerial ability, and to 0.13 when we add a further control for the 
share of college-educated workers.21 Thus, without taking account of variation in capital and 
intermediate inputs, one would conclude that up to about one-half of the (relatively large) effect of 
management scores on productivity is explained by the fact that firms with more advanced management 
practices hire better quality workers – particularly in the upper stratum of the skill distribution. 
 
Column (5) introduces a control for capital (measured by the book value of capital).  Despite the well-
known limitations of book value-based capital measures, this variable has a large positive coefficient 
that is relatively precisely estimated. Introducing capital into the production function leads to a relatively 
large reduction (-40%) in the coefficient on the management score, and to noticeable declines in the 
coefficients on average worker ability, managerial ability, and the fraction of college graduates.  
Nevertheless, all four remain at least marginally significant.   
 
So far we have focused on the impact of measures of worker quality on the measured effect of the 
managerial score variable.  As discussed in Section 2, however, firm-specific pay policies may also 
affect productivity if they are used by the firm to reward greater effort. Some descriptive evidence on 
this mechanism is presented in Figure 7.  Panel A shows a bin-scatter plot relating the estimated firm-
specific wage premiums to log(sales per worker).  These are positively related, as has also been 
documented in other countries (e.g. Card, Cardoso and Kline, 2015, for Portugal and Abowd et al, 1999, 
for France). Panel B presents a bin-scatter plot of the wage premiums against the WMS management 
scores. Again, there is a strong positive relationship, suggesting that firms that use advanced 
management practices tend to pay higher wages to their workers relative to the outside labor market. If 
we regress the firm fixed effect on management scores there is a significant and positive correlation with 
and without the other controls (see Table A7).  
 
                                                 
21 In this column a standard deviation increase in management scores is associated with a 13% increase in productivity which 
is similar to the findings of the Indian RCTs and non-experimental regressions across all countries (Bloom et al, 2014). 
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In column (6) of Table 3 we introduce the firm-specific wage premium as an additional control. As 
expected given the scatter plots this variable has a positive and significant effect.  Its inclusion also leads 
to a further reduction in the effect of the management score variable. 
 
Finally, columns (7)-(10) present estimates for production functions that control for labor, capital, and 
intermediate inputs.22 The baseline specification in column (7) includes only the management score 
variable and the controls for factor inputs.  Relative to the parallel specification in column (1), the effect 
of management practices is reduced by around 80%.  Evidently, more advanced management practices 
are more likely to be adopted by firms with more capital intensive production techniques that also use 
larger shares of intermediate inputs.  Controlling for these factors, the coefficient in row 1 implies that 
a 1 standard deviation unit increase in management practices is associated with a 4.3% increase in 
productivity. 
 
Column (8) adds the two worker ability measures to the 3-factor production function.  Both variables 
are marginally significant and their addition reduces the management-TFP relationship to 0.035. In 
column (9) management practices and ability remain significant even conditional on the share of college 
educated. Finally, in column 10 we add in the estimated firm-specific pay premium, which leads to a 
reduction in the point estimates for the effects of the management score and worker quality variables.  
With only 229 firms included in the analysis we have reached the limits of the data to distinguish between 
the different channels.  
 
The models in Table 3 use a simple average of the 18 management questions on the WMS survey as a 
measure of management practices. We have checked the robustness of our findings by using other ways 
of summarizing the WMS questions, such as using principal components, and by looking at subsets of 
the question-specific scores.  For example, Table A6 presents a series of models similar to ones in Table 
3, but using the first principal component of all 18 questions.  Overall, the results are qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar to those based on simple averages of the z-scores. 
 
b. Analysis Based on TFP 
In Table 4 we implement our preferred TFP specification based on equation (8). This approach has the 
advantage relative to the production approach used in Table 3 of moving the conventional factor inputs 
                                                 
22 Information on intermediate inputs is missing for a sizeable fraction of firms in ORBIS, leading to a 30% reduction in 
sample size. Unlike the case for other control variables we decided not to try and impute the value of intermediate inputs if 
it was missing. 
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(labor, capital, and materials) from the right hand side to left hand side of the regression, reducing the 
effects of measurement errors and endogeneity biases. Moreover, the coefficients on labor, capital and 
materials are allowed to vary across detailed subindustries according to their cost shares. On the other 
hand a TFP approach assumes that the output elasticities with respect to the three factor inputs are equal 
to their cost shares, an assumption which may not be strictly correct. 
 
In general the broad pattern of results in Table 4 is similar to the pattern in Table 3, but the more 
parsimonious specification allows us to estimate the key variables more precisely. The first four columns 
of the table present models where we exclude the firm size, industry, and ownership controls, whereas 
the last four columns present models with these controls included (as in Table 3).  As we move from 
column (1) to column (2) we observe that the controlling for employee quality reduces the management 
coefficient by 24% (= (0.08-0.06))/0.08). Controlling for managerial ability reduces the management 
effect by another 14% and controlling for the firm wage premium reduces it by another 16%. So 
altogether the reduced form association of TFP with management is roughly halved when we introduce 
these additional controls.  
 
We repeat the specifications of columns (1)-(4) in the last four columns of Table 4, but include more 
extensive controls. The results show a qualitatively similar pattern, although the fraction of the 
management coefficient explained by the other controls is smaller (the original management association 
of 0.048 is reduced by about 30% by the final column). Employee ability accounts for only 3%, 
managerial ability 13% and establishment fixed effects in pay a further 13%. The fraction accounted for 
by average employee ability falls compared to the first four columns because we are now controlling for 
the share of employees with a college degree throughout. This suggests that in understanding the 
productivity-management practice correlation, the unobserved human capital (recovered by the AKM 
specifications) of average workers matters less than managerial human capital. 
 
We summarize our estimation results and their implications for our simple structural model in Table 5.  
Recall that the model consists of equation (5), which relates overall workforce quality to average human 
capital (?̅̂?𝑗 ), the firm’s pay premium ( ?̂?𝑗), and observed management practices (Λ 𝑗)  (with coefficients 
𝜌1, 𝜌2, and 𝜌3, respectively); equation  (6), which relates TFP to managerial human capital  ?̅̂?𝑀𝑗  and 
management practices (with coefficients 𝜆1  and 𝜆2 , respectively); and equation (8), which is a log-
linearized three factor production function with coefficients equal to the cost shares of the factors.  From 
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the reduced form coefficients we can recover 𝜌1, 𝜌2, 𝜆1,  and the composite management effect  𝑠𝐿𝜌3 +
𝜆2.  
 
Table 5 shows the reduced form parameter estimates and the associated estimates of the structural 
parameters 𝜌1, and 𝜌2 from the basic TFP specification in column (4) of Table 4, the extended TFP 
specification in column (8) of Table 4, and the production function estimates in column (10) of Table 3. 
Reassuringly, the estimated reduced form and structural parameters are fairly similar across these three 
specifications.  The implied values of 𝜌1̂ (the effect of higher average human capital on labor quality) 
are between 0.4 and 0.5, the implied values of  𝜌2̂ (the effect of a higher pay premium on labor quality) 
are between 0.2 and 0.3, the implied values of 𝜆1 (the effect of a higher human capital of managers on 
TFP) are between 0.05 and 0.08, and composite effects of (standardized) management ability on TFP 
are between 0.03 and 0.04.   
 
While the estimates of the effect of workers’ average human capital on labor quality (𝜌1̂) are relatively 
large, they are still far below 1.0, which is the expected effect if a 1% increase in the average person 
effect at a firm leads to a 1% increase in labor quality.  There are three likely explanations for the gap.  
First, the worker effects are estimated with error.  Second, the firm-wide average skill measure excludes 
part-timers, trainees, and workers outside the 20-60 age range.  Third, there is some slippage introduced 
by the presence of multi-plant establishments in our sample, since we only merge firms to a single 
establishment in the IEB data base.23  We suspect that all three factors lead to some attenuation in the 
measured effect of average worker quality. 
 
Our finding that higher firm-specific wage premiums contribute to average productivity, albeit less than 
proportionally, is also interesting. Taken at face value, point estimates for  𝜌2̂ in the range of 0.20 to 0.30 
suggest that firms receive only a partial productivity offset from offering higher pay. Again, we suspect 
that the estimates could be attenuated by measurement errors in the AKM procedure, and by slippage in 
the match between firms and establishments. 
 
Finally, the finding that average managerial quality has an independent effect on TFP, holding constant 
the average quality of the workforce, provides empirical support for the channel emphasized in Lucas’s 
(1978) original span of control model and many subsequent models of the effect of managers on TFP. 
                                                 
23The establishment identified in the IEB can actually combine 2 or more plants if the plants are all in the same location and 
assigned the same narrow industry code. 
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We also conclude from the pattern of coefficients on the management practice variables (e.g., between 
columns 1 and 4 in Table 4) that the observed effect of management practices in simpler specifications 
represents a combination of direct and indirect effects via workforce selection and pay practices.  We 
turn in the next sub-section to see whether there is any direct evidence that some of the role of 
management practices operates via selection. 
 
IVC. Inflows and Outflows  
We have shown that firms with a more able workforce, and in particular more able workers in the top 
quarter of the skill distribution, tend to have better management practices and higher productivity. We 
now investigate in more detail how firms come to have higher ability employees by looking at the 
inflows and outflows of workers to our firms. 
 
As background, Panel B of Table 1 shows the total numbers of individuals we observe in the IEB data 
set who join or leave one of the matched WBS firms. In total we observe about 122,436 joiners and 
132,600 leavers (roughly 350 joiners and leavers per firm, on average). Most inflows (58%) and most 
outflows (57%) are job-to-job transitions, but substantial fractions of new hires come from 
unemployment (16%) and from other sources (27%).  Likewise many job leavers exit to unemployment 
(30%) or to other destinations (13%).24   
 
Table 6 presents an analysis of the relationship between management ability measures and the faction 
of new recruits at a firm with estimated person effects at or above various percentiles of the overall 
distribution among all new recruits.  The person effects for this analysis are those estimated by CHK for 
the period 1996-2002, prior to the start of the jobs under analysis here. Each column of the table shows 
the coefficient of the management ability index in a model for the fraction of new recruits with person 
effects at or above the percentile listed in the column heading (10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles). 
In column (5) for example, the dependent variable is the proportion of workers who were in the top 
decile of the ability distribution, based on their estimated person effects in the period from 1996 to 2002.  
We present two sets of specifications: a simpler set of models (Panel A) that control for location, 
ownership, industry, female share, and production market competition; and a richer set of specifications 
(Panel B) that also control for firm size. In both specifications the coefficient on the management score 
is positive at every percentile, but particularly strong for workers in the top of the distribution. In the 
                                                 
24 Recall that the third category includes “out of the labor force” as well as employment in jobs outside the coverage of the 
IEB (self-employment and the civil service). 
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specifications without size controls the management score coefficients for the 75th and 90th percentiles 
are highly significant.  As shown in the second panel, these effects are attenuated once we control for 
firm size, but the coefficient in the 90th percentile model remains marginally significant.  Tables A3 and 
A4 repeat the analysis, fitting separate models for inflows from a previous job and from 
unemployment.25  The results are broadly robust to disaggregating in this way.  Overall, we conclude 
that better managed firms are a little more likely to recruit workers from the upper tail of the ability 
distribution. 
 
Table 7 turns to the effect of management ability on the composition of outflows to unemployment. 
These flows are particularly interesting because they arguably reflect termination decisions by the firm 
(i.e., decisions to fire or lay off a worker), rather than decisions by workers to move to another job or 
withdraw from the labor force.  The dependent variable in all the models in Table 7 is the average value 
of the person effect for leavers who move to unemployment, normalized by deviating from the mean 
person effect at the firm among all employees in the previous year.  Thus, the coefficients reflect the 
impact of higher management ability on the differential layoff/firing rate of higher or lower-ability 
workers. 
 
The results in Table 7 suggest that firms with higher management scores are significantly less likely to 
fire or lay off their relatively high-ability workers. This correlation remains robust in column (2) to more 
general controls for firm size, location, the shares of college educated and female workers, firm age, 
competition and ownership. Nevertheless, one might be concerned that the relative skill level of workers 
who are laid off or fired from a particular firm is correlated with some other characteristics of the worker. 
Consequently we also experimented with conditioning on some of the observable characteristics of the 
outflow group, such as age (in column (3)) and whether the individual was college educated (column 
(4)). Interestingly, these controls tend to increase the magnitude of the management score coefficient, 
suggesting that the “quality preference” of better-managed firms is stronger within traditionally 
measured skill groups than between groups.26  
 
                                                 
25 Haltiwanger, Hyatt and McEntarfer (2015) show that there are differential patterns by firm size (and firm wage) for job-
to-job flows compared to other type of flows. 
26 We repeated these specifications looking at outflows to jobs at other firms (see Appendix Tables A4). Although the results 
were of a similar sign they were generally weaker, which is consistent with our prior that the firm policy variables are most 
likely to be seen when looking at exits to unemployment. 
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Tables 6 and 7 together confirm that firms with high WMS management scores select higher ability 
employees and exit lower ability employees to a greater extent than other firms. This is a clear 
mechanism through which they end up with a larger fraction of high ability incumbent employees. We 
estimate that it would take about 9 years for a firm which moved from the bottom 90% into the top decile 
of WMS management scores to converge to the average employee ability score of its peers purely 
through improving the quality of the inflows and outflows.27 
   
IVD. Management Practices and the within plant Dispersion of Wages and ability 
So far we have focused on the importance of management practices for the differences in mean levels 
of productivity and worker ability across firms.  In part, this focus is driven by the recent literature 
emphasizing the role of widening between-firm inequality in overall labor market inequality trends (e.g., 
Faggio et al., 2010; Card, Heining and Kline, 2013, Barth et al., 2014; and Song et al, 2015).  But an 
interesting question is whether advanced management practices are also related to the degree of within-
firm inequality. 
 
We investigate this issue in Table 8.  We begin in columns (1) and (2) with specifications that take the 
90-10 difference in log(wages) at each firm in our sample as the dependent variable.  As suggested by 
the pattern in Figure 1, there is a modest negative correlation between use of advanced management 
practices and within-firm wage inequality, though the effect is at best only marginally significant. In 
columns (3) and (4) we use the coefficient of variation in log daily wages as an alternative measure of 
within-firm dispersion.  With or without other controls firm wage variation is strongly negatively 
correlated with the firm’s management score. Columns (5)-(8) present a parallel set of models, taking as 
a dependent variable the corresponding measure of within-firm inequality in worker quality, as measured 
by the estimated person effects.  Again the findings are consistent with the simple graphical evidence in 
Figure 2, suggesting that better managed firms have a slightly wider distribution of worker skill.  
 
                                                 
27 If we compare firms in the top decile of management to the rest there is a difference of 0.007 (0.554 
vs. 0.547) in the average employee fixed effect. The difference in the average employee ability of joiners 
from the labor force between these two groups of firms is 0.004 (0.555 vs. 0.551), but the inflow rates 
are similar at 6.7%. Hence, improving the quality of inflows will bridge 4.5% (= 0.004*0.067/0.007) of 
the employee ability gap per year. The ability difference of outflows to unemployment is larger at 0.014, 
but the mean outflow rate is only 3.1%, which makes a contribution of 6.5% (= 0.031*0.014/0.007). 
Putting the inflows and outflows channels together implies 11% of the ability gap is closed per year.  
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Overall the conclusion from Table 8 is that firms with high management scores tend to have a little more 
dispersion in skills and a little less dispersion in overall wages. The opposite signs imply that better-
managed firms tend to implement “equalizing” pay policies that offset their more unequal skill 
distributions – a pattern that is inconsistent with the additive proportional pay premium imposed by the 
AKM specification. We believe that additional work on the relationship between within-firm inequality 
and management practices could be a fruitful area for additional research with larger samples. One 
interesting question is whether advanced management practices are related to the use of outsourcing 
practices, which in some cases at least lead to a reduction in the variation in skill levels at the firm (e.g., 
Goldschmidt and Schmieder, 2015). 
 
IVE. Extensions and Robustness  
We also investigated many other outcomes discussed in the Appendix. We examined whether there was 
faster wage growth (as a proxy for promotion) for the more able employees in better managed firms 
(Table A5). Interacting management scores and worker ability together in the wage growth equation we 
did find that better managed firms seemed to promote high ability workers more quickly, but the 
coefficient was insignificant. 
 
Another question is whether our approach of using the AKM fixed effects to proxy for employee, 
managerial and firm “quality” buys us any more information than simply conditioning on average 
wages? There is a tradition in firm-level productivity analysis to include the wage bill instead of 
employment as a measure of  “labor services” (e.g. Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). Under competitive 
markets and perfect substitutability between heterogeneous workers this seems an attractive approach as 
the wage bill is usually available in firm accounts, whereas individual wages are not.   
 
Table A8 investigates this issue, beginning in column (1) with the basic TFP specification from column 
(1) of Table 4. In column (2) we include the log of the average wage bill per employee, taken from the 
firm-wide ORBIS accounts. Consistent with existing work this suggests higher TFP in firms with higher 
average “accounting wages” as the coefficient is positive and (weakly) significant increasing the R2 from 
0.561 to 0.575. If instead of the accounting wage we include our preferred controls there is a larger 
increase in the R2 to 0.685. Furthermore, the average wage estimated from firm accounts is now 
insignificant conditional on our controls for person and firm fixed effects in column (4). In column (5) 
we include the average of the individual log(wages) from the IEB. This is much more powerful than the 
accounting measure (which probably has greater measurement error) explaining 0.679 of the variance, 
almost as much as our AKM measures in the previous column. Nevertheless, including our AKM 
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measures gives additional information over and above the simple average individual wage, with 
employee and managerial ability remaining significant (the joint F-test of the three AKM terms is 9.84 
which is significant at the 1% level). The bottom line from this is that our AKM approach adds much 
more information than simply using the wage bill, and significantly more than simply the average of 
individual wages of the workers currently in the firm.28 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have examined whether some core management practices found to be important for firm 
productivity (e.g. in Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007) are due to the higher ability of employees, especially 
managers, in these firm. We merge the near-population administrative data matched worker-firms in 
Germany (the IEB) with the WMS management data.  We estimate an overall measure of individual 
ability for each worker using the employee fixed effects from wage equations in the manner of Abowd 
et al (1999).  This approach also provides us with information on ability of the top quartile of workers, 
who we interpret as the firm’s managers, and with an estimate of the average pay premium paid by the 
firm relative to the outside labor market. 
 
We show several interesting stylized facts in our data. First, we find a strong relationship between 
average employee ability and management practices.  This is particularly strong at the top end of the 
ability distribution, suggesting that managerial ability is important in explaining why some firms have 
high management scores (over and above average worker skills).  When we estimate production 
functions we find that firms with higher worker and managerial human capital have higher productivity. 
However, the WMS management scores remain significant in production functions and TFP equations 
even after conditioning on all measures of employee ability. Including human capital reduces the 
association of productivity with management by 25 to 50 percent. Although we can never rule out the 
idea that there could be further aspects of human capital we are not accounting for, the continued 
importance of management practices in firm performance regressions is striking. 
 
Delving further into the management-ability relationship, we show that well managed firms have a 
higher stock of higher ability workers employees. They accomplish this at least in part by selection. 
                                                 
28 As with Table 2, we also considered controlling for a number of other observable measures of human capital such as 
general experience and tenure in the job or firm in the TFP regressions, but these did not make any substantial difference to 
the results. 
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They are able to recruit workers from higher points of the ability distribution and remove those from the 
lower part of the distribution. This is revealed through our analysis of inflows and outflows of workers. 
 
Taken as a whole our results suggest that human capital, especially managerial human capital is 
important for the ability to sustain successful management practices. However, there appears to be 
information in the management practice scores that predicts productivity that is not reducible to the 
atoms of human capital employed in the firm. This could be what some scholars have termed corporate 
culture - something that makes a firm more than simply its sum of parts. 
 
This is a fascinating research path to pursue as it links economics with other areas of social science. 
However, it may be that we are still not properly measuring all aspects of human capital in the firm. The 
censoring of the wage distribution may mean, for example, we underestimate the talent of senior 
managers. Combining the data we have here with richer information on the talent of top managers would 
be an important extension of our work (e.g. Bandiera et al, 2011). 
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Figure 1: Fraction of workers of different wage quintiles in low vs high managed score firms  
 
 
Figure 2: Fraction of workers of different ability quintiles (as measured by AKM individual 
fixed effect) in low vs high managed score firms 
 
Notes: “High Management Score” firms are those in the top decile of the WMS management score. 
“Low Management Score” firms are all other firms. We bin all workers into quintiles based on the overall 
distributions of wages or worker ability (as measured by worker fixed effects). Bin 1=lowest 20% and 
bin 5 = highest 20%. We then tabulate the fractions of workers in each quintile at firms in the top 10% 
of management scores and all other firms.  
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Figure 3: Correlation of Management Score and employee ability 
 
Notes: Figure shows bin scatter of management scores against vigntiles of employee ability, as measured 
by the mean firm-level average of estimated person effects from the 1996-2002 period. Management 
scores and employee ability are both standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
 
Figure 4: Correlation of Management Score and employee ability controlling for size 
 
 
Notes: Figure shows bin scatter of management scores against vigntiles of employee ability, as measured 
by the mean firm-level average of estimated person effects from the 1996-2002 period. Both variables 
are residualized by regressing the underlying variable on log(employment). 
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Figure 5: Positive Correlation of Ln(Labor Productivity) and WMS Management scores 
 
Notes: Figure shows bin scatter of ln(sales per worker) against vigntiles of management scores. Both 
variables are residualized by regressing the underlying variable on log(employment). 
 
Figure 6: Productivity is increasing in employee ability, especially for high levels of ability 
 
 
Notes: Figure shows bin scatter of ln(sales per worker) against vigntiles of mean worker ability, as 
measured by mean employee fixed effects. Both variables are residualized by regressing the 
underlying variable on log(employment).   
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Figure 7:  Firm Fixed effect (in wage equation) is correlated with WMS Management Practice 
Score and Productivity 
Panel A: Labor Productivity and Firm Fixed Effect 
 
 
 
Panel B: WMS Management Score and Firm Fixed Effect 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  Figures show bin scatter of log sales per worker (panel A) or management scores (panel B) 
against vigntiles of estimated firm-specific wage premium
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Firms in Matched WMS-IEB Sample 
 Panel A: Firms Mean Median Min Max SD 
Firm located in East Germany (ORBIS) 0.13 0.00 0.00 100 0.34 
Firm age (WMS) 64.34 42.50 1.00 489.67 62.79 
Number of workers in IEB   440.02 238 1.00 6971 642.9 
Proportion Female Workers in IEB  0.27 0.22 0.00 0.89 0.17 
Share Employees with University degree (IEB) 0.12 0.08 0.00 0.80 0.13 
Median daily wage (IEB) 101.58 99.51 37.21 172.60 28.46 
Log of Book Value of Capital (ORBIS 9.89 10.18 2.71 13.82 1.69 
Log of Intermediate Inputs (ORBIS) 11.29 11.78 8.44 14.47 1.07 
Intermediate Input Revenue Share (OECD, Ind. Data) 0.67 0.67 0.57 0.89 0.05 
Share of Labor in Revenue (OECD, Industry Level) 0.23 0.23 0.04 0.30 0.04 
Firm has no competitors (WMS) 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.09 
Firm has less than 5 competitors (WMS) 0.41 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 
Firm has 5 or more competitors(WMS) 0.59 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.59 
Firm is family owned (WMS) 0.23 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.42 
Firm is founder owned (WMS) 0.05 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.21 
Firm is manager owned (WMS) 0.03 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.18 
Firm is non-family private owned (WMS) 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.42 
Firm is institutionally owned (WMS)  0.13 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.33 
Other ownership (WMS) 0.06 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.25 
Ownership unknown (WMS) 0.28 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.45 
Management Score (WMS) 0.00 0.06 -3.25 2.68 1.00 
CHK coverage (share employees with worker effects) 0.79 0.87 0.01 1.00 0.25 
Average employee ability (CHK worker effects) 0.00 -0.186 -5.56 3.40 1.00 
Average managerial ability (CHK top-paid worker effects) 0.00 -0.00 -6.24 2.71 1.00 
Firm Wage Fixed Effect (CHK pay premium) 0.00 0.080 -4.48 3.54 1.00 
Notes: Sample includes 361 firms from 2004, 2006 and 2009 waves of WMS data matched to IEB data 
on workers.  (590 firm-year surveys across all three waves).  See Table A1 for more information on data 
sources and definitions. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Firms in Matched WMS-IEB Sample – contd. 
 
Panel B: Individuals 
 
Notes: Sample includes individuals in the IEB data who joined or exited firms in the WMS-IEB matched panel between 2004 and 2009. 
 
 
  
Variables 
 Inflows to our firms from the 
specified labor market state 
Outflows  from our firms to the 
specified labor market state 
Unemployment  19,013 40,093 
Jobs  70,675 75,023 
Non-participation  32,748 17,584 
Total  122,436 132,600 
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Table 2: Correlations of Firm Management with Average employee and managerial ability 
 
 (1) (2) (3), (4) 
Dependent Variable: Management z-Score Management z-Score Management z-Score Management z-Score 
     
Mean employee ability 0.216***  0.0289 -0.0928 
 (0.0777)  (0.0901) (0.112) 
Mean managerial ability  0.294*** 0.277*** 0.258*** 
  (0.0710) (0.0913) (0.0950) 
Ln(Number of Employees)  0.237*** 0.261*** 0.264*** 0.263*** 
 (0.0486) (0.0484) (0.0497) (0.0500) 
% Employees with college    1.022** 
    (0.452) 
     
Firms 354 354 354 354 
Observations 588 588 588 588 
 
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. All standard errors clustered by 354 firms in parentheses 
under coefficients estimated by OLS. Dependent variables and employee ability measures are z-scored. All columns include a dummy for firm 
located in East Germany, the share of female workers, ownership dummies (family, founder, private, institution, manager and other), the number 
of competitors, a cubic in the coverage rate, firm age, three digit industry dummies and time dummies. Employee ability is mean level of individual 
fixed effect measured over 1996-2002 period. Managerial ability is mean employee ability in the top quartile of the within firm distribution. 
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Table 3: Production Functions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Dependent Variable: Ln(sales) 
 
Ln(sales) 
 
Ln(sales) 
 
Ln(sales) 
 
Ln(sales) Ln(sales) Ln(sales) Ln(sales) Ln(sales) Ln(sales) 
Management Score 0.264*** 0.199*** 0.150*** 0.129*** 0.0743* 0.0655* 0.0434** 0.0348** 0.0325* 0.0294 
 (0.0519) (0.0457) (0.0421) (0.0423) (0.0378) (0.0376) (0.0195) (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0179) 
Employee Ability   0.821*** 0.597*** 0.375*** 0.250** 0.252**  0.110* 0.0825 0.0584 
  (0.144) (0.101) (0.105) (0.0978) (0.110)  (0.0599) (0.0732) (0.0750) 
Managerial ability   0.363*** 0.329*** 0.184* 0.155  0.0819* 0.0823* 0.0819* 
   (0.107) (0.0995) (0.0994) (0.102)  (0.0483) (0.0486) (0.0489) 
% Employees with     1.873*** 1.308*** 1.308***   0.192 0.282 
College degree    (0.642) (0.465) (0.454)   (0.232) (0.226) 
Ln(Labor) 0.315*** 0.446*** 0.589*** 0.591*** 0.389*** 0.389*** 0.0547*** 0.129*** 0.130*** 0.132*** 
 (0.0697) (0.0672) (0.0712) (0.0713) (0.0622) (0.0599) (0.0188) (0.0279) (0.0292) (0.0261) 
Ln(Capital)     0.431*** 0.421*** 0.204*** 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.176*** 
     (0.0484) (0.0473) (0.0227) (0.0221) (0.0227) (0.0219) 
Ln(Materials)       0.696*** 0.667*** 0.663*** 0.661*** 
       (0.0354) (0.0323) (0.0345) (0.0337) 
Ln(firm effect-wages)      0.110**    0.0390* 
      (0.0508)    (0.0226) 
           
Firms 333 333 333 333 333 333 229 229 229 229 
Observations 560 560 560 560 560 560 378 378 378 378 
 
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. All standard errors clustered by firm (in parentheses 
under coefficients estimated by OLS). Management score and employee ability is standardized. All columns include a dummy for East German 
firms, the share of female workers, 5 ownership dummies, dummies for numbers of competitors, firm age, a cubic in the coverage rate, industry 
dummies and time dummies. Mean Employee ability is mean level of individual fixed effect measured over 1996-2002 period. Mean Managerial 
ability is employee ability in the top quartile of the within firm distribution. 
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Table 4: TFP Specifications 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable: LnTFP LnTFP LnTFP LnTFP LnTFP LnTFP LnTFP LnTFP 
         
Management Score 0.0809*** 0.0617*** 0.0528*** 0.0440** 0.0484*** 0.0471*** 0.0411** 0.0358** 
 (0.0211) (0.0195) (0.0187) (0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0174) (0.0170) (0.0171) 
Mean Employee ability   0.176*** 0.113*** 0.103***  0.198*** 0.141** 0.113* 
  (0.0248) (0.0344) (0.0331)  (0.0595) (0.0584) (0.0600) 
Mean Managerial ability   0.0616* 0.0585*   0.0550 0.0516 
   (0.0351) (0.0335)   (0.0340) (0.0337) 
Firm effect (in wages)    0.0699***    0.0508** 
    (0.0184)    (0.0198) 
         
General Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firms 229 229 229 229 229 229 229 229 
Observations 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 
 
 
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. All standard errors clustered by firm (in parentheses 
under coefficients estimated by OLS). Management score, managerial ability and employee ability are standardized. All columns include industry 
dummies, year dummies and firm size. “General controls” are: a dummy for East German firms, the share of female workers, 5 ownership dummies, 
dummies for numbers of competitors, firm age and a cubic in the coverage rate. Mean Employee ability is mean level of individual fixed effect 
measured over 1996-2002 period. Mean Managerial ability is employee ability in the top quartile of the within firm distribution. 
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Table 5: Implied Structural Estimates 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable: Symbol 
Structural  
Parameters 
Reduced form  
coefficient 
TFP basic TFP Full Production  
Function 
       
Management Score Λ 𝑗 𝑠𝐿𝜌3 + 𝜆2 𝜋4 0.044 0.036 0.029 
       
Mean Employee ability  ?̅̂?𝑗  𝑠𝐿𝜌1 𝜋1 0.103 0.113 0.058 
  𝜌1̂  0.447 0.491 0.439 
       
Mean Managerial ability ?̅̂?𝑀𝑗  𝜆1 𝜋3 0.058 0.052 0.082 
       
Firm effect (in wages)  ?̂?𝑗 𝑠𝐿𝜌2 𝜋2 0.070 0.051 0.039 
  𝜌2̂  0.304 0.222 0.295 
       
 
Notes: These are estimates of equation (7). Column (4) uses estimates from Table 4 column (4); column (5) uses estimates from Table 4 column 
(8), column (6) uses estimates from Table 3 column (8). We use the empirical average labor share in revenues of 23% (see Table 1) for the estimates 
of the structural parameters (𝜌1̂ ) and ( 𝜌2̂) in columns (4) and (5) and the estimate of the coefficient on labor from Table 3 column (8) of 0.132 in 
column (6). 
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Table 6: Inflows from Employment and Unemployment 
 
 
 
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. All standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses 
under coefficients estimates by OLS based on 89,688 inflows from employment and unemployment in these firms. The management score is 
standardized. All columns control for east dummy, competition, ownership, log(firm age), female share, industry.  
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: Percentile  of the ability of different quantiles of the inflow distribution 
Percentile 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
Panel A. No Size Control       
Management Score 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.016** 0.019*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
      
% college 0.081*** 0.212*** 0.304*** 0.075 0.090 
 (0.013) (0.029) (0.052) (0.086) (0.057) 
      
Panel B. Including Size Control      
Management Score 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.010* 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
      
% college 0.081*** 0.202*** 0.314*** 0.123 0.139** 
 (0.015) (0.030) (0.050) (0.088) (0.062) 
      
Firm Size: Ln(labor) 0.000 -0.005 0.005 0.026*** 0.026*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
      
Observations 355 355 355 355 355 
 39 
 
Table 7: Outflows to Unemployment 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Ln(Average ability of outflow) – ln(Average ability of incumbents) 
Management Score -0.0909* -0.115** -0.106* -0.133** 
 (0.0528) (0.0584) (0.0595) (0.0570) 
Average age of outflows   0.0478*** 0.0409*** 
   (0.0159) (0.0150) 
% college of outflows    4.887*** 
    (0.861) 
     
General Controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Firms 347 347 347 347 
 
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. All standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses 
under coefficients estimates by OLS based on 40093 outflows to unemployment in these firms. Column (1) includes dummies for industry and 
coverage of AKM effects,  other column additional include a dummy East German firms, share of female workers, share of workers with university 
degrees, firm age, and dummies for competition and ownership. 
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Table 8: Within firm heterogeneity of wages and employee ability 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable: 90-10 ln(wages) 
Coefficient of variation 
in log wages 
90-10 ln(employee 
ability) 
Coefficient of variation 
in  ln(employee ability) 
         
Management Score -0.0373* -0.0289* -0.0965*** -0.0289** 0.0272* 0.0151 0.0347** 0.0229 
 (0.0215) (0.0169) (0.0197) (0.0124) (0.0143) (0.0123) (0.0162) (0.0147) 
         
Observations 571 571 571 571 571 571 571 571 
         
Firms No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. All standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses 
under coefficients estimated by OLS based on 348 firms . “Controls” are size, industry, firm age, east dummy, cubic in coverage rate, ownership 
and competition. 
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ONLINE APPENDICES: NOT INTENDED FOR 
PUBLICATION 
APPENDIX A: DATA 
 
 
A1. Management Data 
 
We overview the WMS data here. More information on an earlier version of the dataset 
can be found in Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2015). More details on the management 
survey in general (including datasets, methods and an on-line benchmarking tool) is 
available on http://worldmanagementsurvey.org/. 
 
Our sampling frame was based on the Bureau van Dijk (BVD) ORBIS dataset. This 
provided sufficient information on companies to conduct a stratified telephone survey 
(company name, address, industry and a size indicator). BVD has accounting information 
on employment, sales and (for most German firms) capital. Apart from size, we did not 
insist on having accounting information to form the sampling population. In every country, 
including Germany, the sampling frame for the management survey was all firms with a 
manufacturing primary industry code (SIC 1987 code between 2000 and 3999), with 
between 50 and 5,000 employees in the most recent year prior to the survey.  
 
Interviewers were each given a randomly selected list of firms from the sampling frame. 
This should therefore be representative of medium sized manufacturing firms. In addition 
to randomly surveying from the sampling frame described above we also resurveyed firms 
in 2006 and 2009 that we interviewed in the 2004 survey wave used in Bloom and Van 
Reenen (2007). This was a sample of 732 firms from France, Germany, the UK and the 
US. In 2009 we also resurveyed all firms interviewed in 2006.  
 
The accounting databases are used to generate our management survey. How does this 
compare to Census data? In Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012) we analyze this in more 
detail. For example, we compare the number of employees for different size bands from 
our sample with the figures for the corresponding manufacturing populations obtained from 
national Census Bureau data from each of the countries. There are several reasons for 
mismatch between Census data and firm level accounts.29 Despite these potential 
differences, the broad picture is that the sample matches up reasonably with the population 
of medium sized manufacturing firms. This suggests our sampling frame covers near to the 
population of all firms for most countries 
 
                                                 
29 First, even though we only use unconsolidated firm accounts, employment may include some jobs in 
overseas branches. Second, the time of when employment is recorded in a Census year will differ from that 
recorded in firm accounts. Third, the precise definition of “enterprise” in the Census may not correspond to 
the “firm” in company accounts. Fourth, we keep firms whose primary industry is manufacturing whereas 
Census data includes only plants whose primary industry code is manufacturing. Fifth, there may be 
duplication of employment in accounting databases due to the treatment of consolidated accounts. Finally, 
reporting of employment is not mandatory for the accounts of all firms in all countries.  
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Of the German firms we contacted 58.6% took part in the survey: a high success rate given 
the voluntary nature of participation, which was aided by our endorsement letter from the 
Bundesbank (the German Central Bank). Of the remaining firms 27.2% refused to be 
surveyed, while the remaining 14.2% were in the process of being scheduled when the 
survey ended. In Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2015) we analyze the probability of being 
interviewed. Larger firms and multinationals were more likely to agree to be interviewed, 
although the size of this effect is not large or significant – firms were about 4 percentage 
points more likely for a doubling in size. Further, the decision to be interviewed is 
uncorrelated with revenues per worker, a basic productivity measure. This is an important 
result as it suggests we are not interviewing particularly high or low performing firms. Firm 
age and  return on capital are also uncorrelated with response rates.  
 
We have firm accounting data on sales, employment, capital, intermediate inputs, profits, 
shareholder equity, long-term debt, market values (for quoted firms) and wages (where 
available). BVD have extensive information on ownership structure, so we can use this to 
identify whether the firm was part of a multinational enterprise. We also asked specific 
questions on the multinational status of the firm (whether it owned plants aboard and the 
country where the parent company is headquartered) to be able to distinguish domestic 
multinationals from foreign multinationals. We collected many variables through our 
survey including information on plant size, skills, organization, etc. as described in the 
main text.  
 
Management Practices were scored following the methodology of Bloom and Van Reenen 
(2007), with practices grouped into three areas: monitoring (eight practices), targets (five 
practices) and incentives (five practices). The monitoring section focuses on the 
introduction of lean manufacturing techniques, the documentation of processes 
improvements, the tracking of performance of individuals, reviewing performance, and 
consequence management. The targets section examines the type of targets, the realism of 
the targets, the transparency of targets and the range and interconnection of targets. Finally, 
the incentives section includes promotion criteria, pay and bonuses, and fixing or firing 
bad performers, where best practice is deemed the approach that gives strong rewards for 
those with both ability and effort. Our management measure averages the z-scores of all 
18 dimensions and then z-scores again this average. Details of all the questions are in 
Appendix B. 
 
A2. Estimating Employee and Firm Fixed Effects in the IEB 
 
We follow Card et al (2013) in estimating the worker and firm fixed effects (see their online 
appendix for more details, 
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/suppl/2013/04/02/qjt006.DC1/QJEC12803_KLINE_
online_appendix_compiled.pdf) 
 
Briefly, the IEB consists of information on employment spells at a given establishment 
within a calendar-year, the average daily wage (censored at the Social Security maximum 
earnings level); information on the gender, birth date, education and occupation of the 
individual and the industry and geographical location of the firm. 
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We use all full-time males and females age 20-60 working for non-marginal jobs. One 
observation per person-firm-year is selected (excluding those with a daily wage under 10 
Euros). Education is coded into 5 classes.  
 
Roughly 10% of person-year observations for male workers and 1-2% of observations for 
female workers are top coded. We follow Dustmann et al (2009) and a fit a series of Tobit 
models to log daily wages. We then impute an uncensored value for each censored 
observation using the estimated parameters of these models and a random draw from the 
associated (left-censored) distribution. 500 Tobit models are estimated separately by year, 
education and 10 year age range with the following variables: age, mean log wage in other 
years, fraction of censored wages,  a dummy for individuals only observed one year 1985-
2009, and a dummy for one worker firm. Card et al (2013) report various validation 
exercises for the Tobit specifications. 
 
Estimation of equation (4) proceeded in two steps. First the model is fitted to the sample 
of movers between firms to recover the vector of establishment fixed effects along with the 
vector of coefficients on the time varying covariates. Then for each worker who stayed at 
the same establishment over the sample interval, the estimated person effect is calculated 
as a residual averaged over the time period the worker stayed at the same workplace. 
 
The main fixed effects we use in this paper rely on the period 1996-2002 (see text) prior to 
the management surveys. The only exception is the outflow analysis were we use the fixed 
effects estimated in 2002-09. 
 
A3. Merging Firms in WMS with IEB 
 
As noted in the text, the WMS sampling frame was taken from the BVD ORBIS database 
for Germany (which is the population of incorporated firms). We selected firms whose 
primary industry was manufacturing and who reported having between 50 and 5,000 
employees. Interviewers were given random lists of names and telephone numbers within 
this frame and sought to interview a plant manager in the firm. The address of the plant 
(and name of manager) was collected when a successful interview occurred.  
 
The IEB is an establishment-level database where we also know the address and name of 
the establishment. Although most firms are single plant, there can be multi-plant 
establishments and firms. We used a master list maintained by the Federal Employment 
Agency and merged using a probabilistic record linkage based on firm names and 
addresses.30 Data from both sources underwent extensive preprocessing to harmonize 
spelling and correct typing errors. For the data linkage process we were supported by the 
German Record Linkage Center and used the probabilistic Jaro algorithm (Jaro, 1989) 
implemented in the Merge-Tool-Box (Bachteler, 2011).31  To speed up the linkage process 
                                                 
30 The master list is the BA-Betriebedatei 2006 and contains information on approximately 2 million 
establishments. 
31 The Merge-Tool-Box is a free Java based record linkage program developed by Rainer Schnell (Schnell et 
al. 2005). 
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we blocked the data on three-digit postcodes, and limited the matching process to 
plants/establishments in the same three-digit postcode (with at most one match per plant). 
We then conducted manual quality checks and editing (including internet research on firm 
names and addresses) for plants in the WMS that were unmatched, or were matched with 
relative uncertainty. 
 
For the majority of the WMS data we can match to IEB straightforwardly on address and 
name. For some WMS plants belonging to multi-plant companies, we have the issue that 
IEB name may not correspond easily to the company name. We do, however, have the 
address from both IEB and WMS which usually resolved any ambiguity. When there still 
remained any ambiguity (e.g. multiple establishments in a single address, like an industrial 
park) we could use a combination of the names, whether the plant was a production plant 
(all WMS plants produce goods, whereas this is not the case in the IEB) and the number of 
employees at the plant (available in both datasets) to cleanly identify the IEB-WMS 
matches.  
 
Data at the firm level is at a higher level of aggregation than the establishment. Just as 
multiple plants can belong to a single establishment, multiple establishments can below to 
a single firm. Accounting data on sales, investment and intermediate inputs is only 
available at the firm level. Hence, when running production functions or TFP equations we 
should be aware that the accounting measures are only for firm-wide quantities. In the 
WMS, respondents were encouraged to think of the firm as a whole when answering the 
questions rather than just their plant. Nevertheless, even if the manager found his plant’s 
practices the most salient in the interview, the management score is still the best predictor 
of firm-level average practices. In the few cases when we had multiple 
plants/establishments in the same firm we averaged the responses.  
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Figure A1: Employee ability and managerial ability Distribution 
Panel A: Overall distribution 
 
 
 
Panel B: Distribution of managerial ability  split by whether the firm has a high or 
low management practices score 
 
 
 
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
D
e
n
s
it
y
-4 -2 0 2 4
Standardized values of ability
Avg. employee ability Avg. managerial ability
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.2111
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
D
e
n
s
it
y
-4 -2 0 2 4
Standardized values of managerial ability
Top quartile firms
Bottom quarti le firms
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.2604
 46 
Table A1: Description and source of variables 
Variable Source Description 
Average employee  
ability  
IAB Firm average of employee ability measured 
for the period 1996 to 2002 from wage 
regressions (see text). For cross section this 
is an annual value on June 30th and for 
pooled data this is the average over the 
observation period (2003-2009) The cross 
section is used for the correlation and the 
production function. Flows are based on the 
pooled data. 
Coverage IAB-WMS 
match 
Share of workers in a firm that is covered 
by the estimated employee effects  
Average Managerial 
Ability 
IAB Average of estimated employee fixed effect 
for those in the top quartile of the ability 
distribution 
Inflow above the 75th 
percentile of ability 
IAB Fraction of total inflows in the sample 
above the 75th percentile of the ability 
distribution (in the sample as a whole) to a 
particular firm. Ability measured 1996 to 
2002.  Other percentiles defined 
analogously. Inflow pool is specific to 
flows from one of the three labor market 
states (unemployment, other jobs an d non-
employment)  
Ability of the outflows IAB This averages the ability of the outflows 
(ability measure 2002 to 2009). Calculated 
for all outflow destinations separately to the 
three labor market states (unemployment, 
other jobs an d non-employment) 
Female share IAB Share of female workers in the firm 
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College share IAB Share of workers with college or university 
degree in the firm, or among the 
inflows/outflows 
Age of 
inflows/outflows 
IAB Avg. age of the individuals entering or 
leaving the firm 
East Germany IAB Firm is located in East Germany 
Firm Age WMS How many years firm has existed  
Labour IAB Number of employees  
Capital WMS/BVD Historical value of fixed asses 
Materials WMS/BVD Cost of all intermediate inputs 
Competition WMS Categorical, 1: no competitors, 2: less than 
5 competitors, 3: 5 or more competitors 
Ownership WMS Six types: Family;  Founder; Institution; 
Manager;  Other; Private 
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Table A2: Correlations of Management with Individual Ability, additional controls for tenure and experience 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: Management z-Score 
Management z-
Score 
Management z-
Score 
Management z-
Score 
Management z-
Score 
      
Mean employee ability -0.0928 -0.111 -0.0748 -0.0844 -0.110 
 (0.112) (0.109) (0.106) (0.105) (0.108) 
Mean managerial ability 0.258*** 0.248*** 0.246*** 0.243*** 0.239** 
 (0.0950) (0.0944) (0.0901) (0.0928) (0.0932) 
Ln(Number of Employees)  0.263*** 0.276*** 0.263*** 0.253*** 0.263*** 
 (0.0500) (0.0513) (0.0497) (0.0508) (0.0532) 
% Employees with college 1.022** 1.070** 0.943** 1.033** 1.129** 
 (0.452) (0.453) (0.476) (0.459) (0.532) 
Ln(labor market exp.)   -0.306  0.201 
   (0.316)  (0.669) 
Ln(Tenure with firm)  -0.114   -0.0984 
  (0.0742)   (0.0831) 
Ln(Employee age)    -0.0242 -0.0291 
    (0.0157) (0.0321) 
      
Observations 588 588 588 588 588 
 
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. All standard errors clustered by firm (in parentheses 
under coefficients estimated by OLS). Management score and employee ability is standardized. All columns include a dummy for East German 
firms, the share of female workers, 5 ownership dummies, dummies for numbers of competitors, firm age, a cubic in the coverage rate, industry 
dummies and time dummies. Mean Employee ability is mean level of individual fixed effect measured over 1996-2002 period. Mean Managerial 
ability is employee ability in the top quartile of the within firm distribution.  
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Table A3: Inflows from Employment 
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. All standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses 
under coefficients estimates by OLS. The management score is standardized. Panel A controls for east dummy, competition, ownership, ln(firm 
age), female share and industry dummies. Panel B has additional controls for age of inflows. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: Percentile  of the ability of different quantiles of the inflow distribution 
Percentile 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
Panel A. No Size Control       
Management Score 0.00227 0.00356 0.0102* 0.0194*** 0.0201*** 
 (0.00246) (0.00423) (0.00525) (0.00694) (0.00663) 
      
% college 0.103*** 0.213*** 0.207*** -0.0317 0.0279 
 (0.0177) (0.0327) (0.0517) (0.0653) (0.0630) 
      
Panel B. Including Size Control      
Management Score 0.00160 0.00465 0.00812 0.00934 0.0106 
 (0.00254) (0.00432) (0.00541) (0.00669) (0.00651) 
      
% college 0.00178 -0.00347 0.00606 0.0298*** 0.0276*** 
 (0.00244) (0.00407) (0.00517) (0.00726) (0.00750) 
      
Firm Size: Ln(labor) 0.107*** 0.209*** 0.217*** 0.0153 0.0725 
 (0.0187) (0.0331) (0.0507) (0.0671) (0.0658) 
      
Observations 353 353 353 353 353 
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Table A4: Inflows from unemployment 
 
 
 
Notes: This is the equivalent of Table 4 except using inflows from non-participation (instead of unemployment) as the dependent variable. *** 
indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. All standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses under 
coefficients estimates by OLS based on 32,763 inflows from unemployment in these firms. The management score is standardized. Panel A controls 
for east dummy, competition, ownership, log(firm age), female share and industry dummies. Panel B has additional controls for age of inflows and 
college share of inflows.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: Percentile  of the ability of different quantiles of the inflow distribution 
Percentile 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
Panel A. No Size Control       
Management Score 0.00219 0.00328 -0.00117 0.0229*** 0.0218*** 
 (0.00246) (0.00453) (0.00709) (0.00880) (0.00838) 
      
% college 0.0313* 0.110*** 0.288*** 0.0903 0.0960 
 (0.0163) (0.0296) (0.0548) (0.0671) (0.0736) 
      
Panel B. Including Size Control      
Management Score 0.00231 0.00324 0.00000 0.0119 0.0131 
 (0.00234) (0.00471) (0.00852) (0.00945) (0.00957) 
      
% college 0.0298 0.109*** 0.283*** 0.148** 0.142* 
 (0.0182) (0.0317) (0.0518) (0.0739) (0.0801) 
      
Firm Size: Ln(labor) -0.000165 0.000606 -0.00339 0.0324*** 0.0251** 
 (0.00342) (0.00504) (0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0100) 
      
Observations 344 344 344 344 344 
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Table A5: Annual average wage growth for entries from employment and unemployment combined 
 
 
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. All standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses 
under coefficients estimated by OLS. Management, individual ability, management score and individual ability are standardized. All columns 
include industry dummies, a cubic in coverage, whether individual is female/ has a college degree a quadratic in individual age², firm’s share of 
women, ln(firm age), ln(firm size), and dummies for being located in East Germany, and controls for competition and ownership; column (4) 
additionally includes interactions between management (promoting high performers) and college respectively age. 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: wage growth wage growth wage growth wage growth wage growth 
      
Management -0.00127  -0.00104 -0.00104  
 (0.0017)  (0.0017) (0.0017)  
Promoting high performers     0.00128 
     (0.0048) 
Employee ability  -0.00728*** -0.00719*** -0.00713*** -0.00732*** 
  (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) 
Management * Employee ability    -0.000755 -0.0000158 
    (0.00099) (0.00088) 
      
Observations 
37,499 
 
37,499 37,499 37,499 37,499 
No of firms 357 357 357 357 357 
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Table A6: Production function (Principal Component Analysis) 
 
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. All standard errors clustered by 333 firms in parentheses 
under coefficients estimates by OLS. Management score uses first principal component and employee ability is standardized. All columns include 
a dummy for East German firms, the share of female workers, 5 ownership dummies, dummies for numbers of competitors, firm age, a quadratic 
in the coverage rate, industry dummies and time dummies. Mean Employee ability is mean level of individual fixed effect measured over 1996-
2002 period. Mean Managerial ability is employee ability in the top quartile of the within firm distribution. 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable: Ln(sales) Ln(sales) Ln(sales) Ln(sales) Ln(sales) Ln(sales) Ln(sales) Ln(sales) 
         
Management Score 0.108*** 0.0820*** 0.0618*** 0.0539*** 0.0309** 0.0170** 0.0135* 0.0126* 
 (0.0207) (0.0182) (0.0168) (0.0170) (0.0151) (0.00790) (0.00710) (0.00710) 
Mean Employee Ability   0.819*** 0.597*** 0.375*** 0.250**  0.110* 0.0823 
  (0.143) (0.101) (0.105) (0.0979)  (0.0599) (0.0731) 
Mean Managerial ability   0.361*** 0.327*** 0.183*  0.0819* 0.0823* 
   (0.107) (0.0996) (0.0995)  (0.0483) (0.0486) 
% Employees with     1.871*** 1.308***   0.194 
College degree    (0.641) (0.464)   (0.232) 
Ln(Labor) 0.313*** 0.444*** 0.587*** 0.589*** 0.389*** 0.0548*** 0.129*** 0.130*** 
 (0.0695) (0.0671) (0.0712) (0.0713) (0.0622) (0.0188) (0.0279) (0.0292) 
Ln(Capital)     0.431*** 0.204*** 0.181*** 0.182*** 
     (0.0484) (0.0227) (0.0221) (0.0227) 
Ln(Materials)      0.696*** 0.666*** 0.663*** 
      (0.0355) (0.0324) (0.0345) 
         
Observations 560 560 560 560 560 378 378 378 
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Table A7: Correlation of Firm Fixed effect in wages with the WMS management score 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable: Firm effect Firm effect  Firm effect  Firm effect  Firm effect  Firm effect  
       
Management Score  0.201*** 0.140*** 0.124*** 0.102*** 0.101*** 0.0810** 
 (0.0450) (0.0370) (0.0397) (0.0387) (0.0387) (0.0406) 
Ln(Labor)   0.0613 0.0873* 0.0965 0.0893 
   (0.0440) (0.0472) (0.0593) (0.0543) 
% Employees with     1.012*** 0.655 0.530 
College degree    (0.348) (0.594) (0.477) 
Mean Employee Ability         0.121 -0.0553 
     (0.225) (0.241) 
Mean Managerial ability         0.291** 
      (0.139) 
General Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 588 588 588 588 588 588 
 
 
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. All standard errors clustered by 354 firms in parentheses 
under coefficients estimated by OLS. Dependent variable, management score and employee ability measures are z-scored. All columns include a 
dummy for firm located in East Germany, the share of female workers, ownership dummies (family, founder, private, institution, manager and 
other), the number of competitors, firm age, a quadratic in the coverage rate, three digit industry dummies and time dummies. Mean Employee 
ability is mean level of individual fixed effect measured over 1996-2002 period. Mean Managerial ability is employee ability in the top quartile of 
the within firm distribution. 
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Table A8: TFP equations with average wages on right hand side  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: Ln(TFP) Ln(TFP) Ln(TFP) Ln(TFP) Ln(TFP) Ln(TFP) 
Ln(average accounting wage)  0.204*  0.0744   
  (0.104)  (0.0948)   
Average individual ln(wage)     0.596*** 0.454*** 
     (0.0715) (0.101) 
Mean employee ability   0.103*** 0.104***  0.0677* 
   (0.0331) (0.0331)  (0.0366) 
Mean managerial ability        0.0585* 0.0571*  0.0586* 
   (0.0335) (0.0334)  (0.0330) 
Firm fixed effect in wages        0.0699*** 0.0637***  0.00666 
   (0.0184) (0.0202)  (0.0217) 
Management Score 0.0809*** 0.0740*** 0.0440** 0.0429** 0.0375** 0.0278* 
 (0.0211) (0.0203) (0.0183) (0.0181) (0.0153) (0.0153) 
Observations 378 378 378 378 378 378 
R-squared 0.561 0.575 0.685 0.687 0.679 0.725 
 
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. All standard errors clustered by firm (in parentheses 
under coefficients estimated by OLS). Management score, managerial ability and employee ability are standardized. All columns include industry 
dummies, a quadratic in the coverage rate, year dummies and firm size. Mean Employee ability is mean level of individual fixed effect measured 
over 1996-2002 period. Mean Managerial ability is employee ability in the top quartile of the within firm distribution. 
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APPENDIX B1: MANAGEMENT PRACTICES QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Any score from 1 to 5 can be given, but the scoring guide and examples are only provided for scores of 1, 3 and 5. The survey also includes a set of Questions that 
are asked to score each dimension, which are included in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). 
 
(1)  Modern manufacturing, introduction 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Other than Just-In-Time (JIT) delivery from 
suppliers few modern manufacturing 
techniques have been introduced, (or have 
been introduced in an ad-hoc manner) 
Some aspects of modern manufacturing 
techniques have been introduced, through 
informal/isolated change programs 
All major aspects of modern manufacturing have been 
introduced (Just-In-Time, autonomation, flexible 
manpower, support systems, attitudes and behaviour) in 
a formal way 
 
(2) Modern manufacturing, rationale 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Modern manufacturing techniques were 
introduced because others were using them. 
Modern manufacturing techniques were 
introduced to reduce costs 
Modern manufacturing techniques were introduced to 
enable us to meet our business objectives (including 
costs) 
(3) Process problem documentation 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: No, process improvements are made when 
problems occur. 
Improvements are made in one week 
workshops involving all staff, to improve 
performance in their area of the plant 
Exposing problems in a structured way is integral to 
individuals’ responsibilities and resolution occurs as a 
part of normal business processes rather than by 
extraordinary effort/teams 
(4) Performance tracking 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Measures tracked do not indicate directly if 
overall business objectives are being met. 
Tracking is an ad-hoc process (certain 
processes aren’t tracked at all) 
Most key performance indicators are tracked 
formally. Tracking is overseen by senior 
management.  
Performance is continuously tracked and communicated, 
both formally and informally, to all staff using a range of 
visual management tools. 
(5) Performance review 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Performance is reviewed infrequently or in 
an un-meaningful way, e.g. only success or 
failure is noted. 
Performance is reviewed periodically with 
successes and failures identified.  Results are 
communicated to senior management. No 
clear follow-up plan is adopted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Performance is continually reviewed, based on indicators 
tracked.  All aspects are followed up ensure continuous 
improvement. Results are communicated to all staff 
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(6) Performance dialogue 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: The right data or information for a 
constructive discussion is often not present 
or conversations overly focus on data that is 
not meaningful. Clear agenda is not known 
and purpose is not stated explicitly 
Review conversations are held with the 
appropriate data and information present. 
Objectives of meetings are clear to all 
participating and a clear agenda is present. 
Conversations do not, as a matter of course, 
drive to the root causes of the problems. 
Regular review/performance conversations focus on 
problem solving and addressing root causes. Purpose, 
agenda and follow-up steps are clear to all. Meetings are 
an opportunity for constructive feedback and coaching. 
(7) Consequence management   
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Failure to achieve agreed objectives does 
not carry any consequences 
Failure to achieve agreed results is tolerated 
for a period before action is taken. 
A failure to achieve agreed targets drives retraining in 
identified areas of weakness or moving individuals to 
where their skills are appropriate 
(8) Target balance   
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Goals are exclusively financial or 
operational 
Goals include non-financial targets, which 
form part of the performance appraisal of top 
management only (they are not reinforced 
throughout the rest of organization) 
Goals are a balance of financial and non-financial 
targets. Senior managers believe the non-financial 
targets are often more inspiring and challenging than 
financials alone. 
(9)  Target interconnection   
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Goals are based purely on accounting 
figures (with no clear connection to 
shareholder value) 
Corporate goals are based on shareholder 
value but are not clearly communicated 
down to individuals 
Corporate goals focus on shareholder value. They 
increase in specificity as they cascade through business 
units ultimately defining individual performance 
expectations. 
(10) Target time horizon   
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Top management's main focus is on short 
term targets 
There are short and long-term goals for all 
levels of the organization. As they are set 
independently, they are not necessarily 
linked to each other 
Long  term goals are translated into specific short term 
targets so that short term targets become a "staircase" to 
reach long term goals 
(11) Targets are stretching   
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Goals are either too easy or impossible to 
achieve; managers provide low estimates to 
ensure easy goals 
In most areas, top management pushes for 
aggressive goals based on solid economic 
rationale. There are a few "sacred cows" that 
are not held to the same rigorous standard 
 
 
 
 
 
Goals are genuinely demanding for all divisions. They 
are grounded in solid, solid economic rationale 
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(12) Performance clarity   
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Performance measures are complex and not 
clearly understood. Individual performance 
is not made public 
Performance measures are well defined and 
communicated; performance is public in all 
levels but comparisons are discouraged 
Performance measures are well defined, strongly 
communicated and reinforced at all reviews;  
performance and rankings are made public to induce 
competition 
(13) Managing human capital   
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Senior management do not communicate 
that attracting, retaining and developing 
talent throughout the organization is a top 
priority 
Senior management believe and 
communicate that having top talent 
throughout the organization is a key way to 
win 
Senior managers are evaluated and held accountable on 
the strength of the talent pool they actively build 
(14) Rewarding high-performance   
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: People within our firm are rewarded 
equally irrespective of performance level 
Our company has an evaluation system for 
the awarding of performance related rewards 
We strive to outperform the competitors by providing 
ambitious stretch targets with clear performance related 
accountability and rewards 
(15) Removing  poor performers   
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Poor performers are rarely removed from 
their positions  
Suspected poor performers stay in a position 
for a few years before action is taken 
We move poor performers out of the company or to less 
critical roles as soon as a weakness is identified 
(16) Promoting high performers   
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: People are promoted primarily upon the 
basis of tenure 
People are promoted upon the basis of 
performance 
We actively identify, develop and promote our top 
performers 
(17) Attracting human capital    
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Our competitors offer stronger reasons for 
talented people to join their companies 
Our value proposition to those joining our 
company is comparable to those offered by 
others in the sector. 
We provide a unique value proposition to encourage 
talented people join our company above our competitors 
(18) Retaining human capital   
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: 
 
We do little to try to keep our top talent. We usually work hard to keep our top talent. We do whatever it takes to retain our top talent. 
Source: Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) 
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